A survey of Fault Attacks in Pairing Based Cryptography

Nadia El Mrabet (1, 2) , Jacques Jean-Alain Fournier (2, 3) , Louis Goubin (4) , Ronan Lashermes (4)

1 LIASD - Laboratoire d'Informatique Avancée de Saint-Denis
2 SAS-ENSMSE - Département Systèmes et Architectures Sécurisés
3 CEA-LETI - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives - Laboratoire d'Electronique et de Technologie de l'Information
4 PRISM - Parallélisme, Réseaux, Systèmes, Modélisation

The latest implementations of pairings allow efficient schemes for Pairing Based Cryptography. These make the use of pairings suitable for small and constrained devices (smart phones, smart cards.. .) in addition to more powerful platforms. As for any cryptographic algorithm which may be deployed in insecure locations, these implementations must be secure against physical attacks, and in particular fault attacks. In this paper, we present the state-of-the-art of fault attacks against pairing algorithms, more precisely fault attacks against the Miller algorithm and the final exponentiation which are the two parts of a pairing calculation. 4

Mots clés: Pairing based cryptography; Miller's algorithm; fault attacks

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Nadia El Mrabet, Jacques Jean-Alain Fournier, Louis Goubin, Ronan Lashermes. A survey of Fault Attacks in Pairing Based Cryptography. 2015, ⟨10.1007/s12095-014-0114-5⟩. ⟨hal-01197172⟩